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In re Hughes, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 46 (July 16, 2020)1 
 
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE: CONTEMPT OF COURT IN FAMILY LAW DISPUTES 
 
Summary 
 
 A judge who modified a mother’s custody rights was disciplined by the Nevada 
Commission on Judicial Discipline. The Commission found that the judge held the mother in 
contempt for failing to comply with the father’s visitation rights, but the judge did not allow the 
mother to rebut the judge’s finding. In addition, the judge modified the mother’s custody rights 
of the child, which the Commission found was a sanction to holding the mother in contempt. The 
Commission ordered the judge to be publicly reprimanded and take a mandatory course on 
family law. The judge appealed the Commission’s disciplinary actions. The Court held that, 
when taking all the facts into context, the judge did not hold the mother in contempt, but instead 
admonished the mother and scheduled a show-cause hearing to then decide whether or not to 
hold the mother in contempt. The Court also held that the custody rights modification was not a 
sanction to holding the mother in contempt, but was made for the best interest of the child. The 
Court reversed the Commission’s disciplinary actions because there was no showing of a 
deliberate or knowing violation, and there were no aggravating factors found. 
 
Background 
 
 Judge Hughes is a family court judge who took over a pending divorce decree when she 
began her judgeship. The divorce decree between the mother and father granted shared joint 
custody over their child, in which the mother had primary custody and the father had weekend 
visitation rights. The father was unhappy with the mother’s transfer of the child on the weekends. 
 
 Judge Hughes held a status check regarding the weekend exchanges. During that hearing, 
Judge Hughes admonished the mother that if she did not participate in the weekend exchanges 
with the father, she would be held in contempt. However, this admonishment was never 
recorded. A month later, Judge Hughes found that the mother still did not participate in the 
weekend exchanges with the father, and thus, violated the father’s parental rights and Judge 
Hughes’ previous order. Judge Hughes allegedly found the mother in contempt from her 
previous admonishment and ordered another hearing with the child present. 
 
 Judge Hughes granted the father temporary sole custody of the child. Judge Hughes 
reasoned this order based on her belief that it would be in the child’s best interest to grant the 
father temporary sole custody because the mother was not complying with the weekend 
exchanges and hindering the child’s relationship with the father. 
 
 At the next hearing, Judge Hughes did not hold the mother in contempt because the 
admonishment from the prior hearing was never recorded, so according to the record, there was 
nothing to hold the mother in contempt of. 
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 The mother filed a disciplinary complaint to the Nevada Commission on Judicial 
Discipline (Commission) regarding Judge Hughes’ decision to hold the mother in contempt. The 
Commission charged Judge Hughes for holding the mother in contempt without allowing the 
mother an opportunity to contest the contempt order and punishing the mother for not complying 
with the admonishment by lessening the mother’s custody rights. Judge Hughes replied to the 
charges, claiming that she did not formally hold the mother in contempt, but found only a prima 
facie case of contempt and set to hold a show-cause hearing for the mother to rebut the prima 
facie case at a later time. Judge Hughes also claimed that she reduced the mother’s custody rights 
because she thought it was in the best interest for the child, not as a punishment. 
 
 The Commission found that Judge Hughes did find the mother in contempt without 
giving the mother the opportunity to rebut that finding and used the finding of contempt as 
justification for lessening the mother’s custody rights. Because of these findings, the 
Commission ruled that Judge Hughes violated five canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct and 
sentenced Judge Hughes to a public reprimand and a mandatory course at the National Judicial 
College to better handle family law issues. Judge Hughes appealed the Commission’s findings 
and sentence. 
 
Discussion 
 
 The Court will defer to the Commission’s findings if there was clear and convincing 
evidence in the record to support those findings.2  
 
Clear and convincing evidence does not support the Commission's findings that Judge Hughes 
held the mother in contempt and that Judge Hughes changed the custodial arrangement as a 
contempt sanction. 
  
 The Court held that there was not clear and convincing evidence that Judge Hughes held 
the mother in contempt for not following her visitation order and lessened the mother’s custody 
rights as a punishment for being in contempt. Judge Hughes’ order asserting that the mother was 
in contempt for respecting the father’s visitation rights also established a show-cause hearing at a 
later date for the mother to respond before being found in contempt. Thus, the Court found Judge 
Hughes’ order to be ambiguous because there were two possible interpretations from it.3 Because 
the order was ambiguous, the Court reviewed Judge Hughes’ order as a whole and applied the 
interpretation that was most reasonable with the facts and law.4 
 
 The Court found that, taking the facts and order as a whole, Judge Hughes’ order did not 
hold the mother in contempt. The contempt by the mother was indirect because it did not occur 
in front of Judge Hughes. Indirect contempt cannot be immediately sanctioned because there are 
necessary procedural safeguards that must be respected before adjudicating and sanctioning 
someone for contempt.5  The mother was subject to civil contempt by Judge Hughes’ order 
because Judge Hughes wanted to correct the mother’s noncompliance with the visitation order. 
 
2  In re Fine, 116 Nev. 1001, 1013, 13 P.3d 400, 408 (2000). 
3  See Margrave v. Dermody Props., Inc., 110 Nev. 824, 827, 878 P.2d 291, 293 (1994). 
4  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thorpe, 123 Nev. 565, 570, 170 P.3d 989, 993 (2007). 
5  See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826–27 (1994). 
Thus, Judge Hughes’ contempt order was meant to ensure the mother’s future compliance with 
the visitation order, which would be reviewed at the show-cause hearing; if the mother was still 
shown not to have complied with the contempt order at that hearing, then Judge Hughes’ would 
have ruled that the mother was in contempt and issued the mother a sanction. In addition, Judge 
Hughes found only a prima facie case for contempt, which the mother could have rebutted at the 
show-cause hearing. Lastly, Judge Hughes’ order only addressed possible sanctions for being 
found in contempt, but did not issue any upon the mother. 
 
 The Court also found that there was not clear and convincing evidence that Judge 
Hughes’ modification of the custody rights between the mother and father was a sanction on the 
mother for being in contempt. The modification of custody rights was in the best interest of the 
child. Judge Hughes found that the mother was alienating the child from the father, which was 
not in the best interest of the child. While Judge Hughes did tell the mother that continuing to not 
comply with the visitation order would result in being found in contempt, Judge Hughes did not 
ever state that the mother was already in contempt. In addition, Judge Hughes scheduled a later 
hearing to review the mother’s compliance and then to decide to hold the mother in contempt. 
 
 Judge Hughes had the authority to issue a temporary custody change before holding the 
mother in contempt.6 Also, the Court ruled that a review of a judge’s abuse of discretion is for an 
appellate court, and not the Commission, to decide.7  
 
 Because Judge Hughes did not find the mother in contempt prior to a show-cause hearing 
and did not modify the mother’s custody rights as a sanction to finding the mother in contempt, 
Judge Hughes did not violate any of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
 
The statutes governing judicial discipline do not support the discipline imposed based on the 
Commission's findings. 
 
 After finding that Judge Hughes violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Commission 
ordered Judge Hughes to be publically reprimanded and take a mandatory family law course at 
the National Judicial College. 
 
 The Court noted that a judge can be sanctioned, and sanctions vary based on the judge’s 
misconduct.8 However, the Court also stated that a public reprimand is a severe sanction, one 
that may only be issued if aggravating factors are present or if the violation is not knowing or 
deliberate. 9  The Court held that Judge Hughes did not commit any knowing or deliberate 
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and that there were no aggravating factors justifying a 
public reprimand. At most, Judge Hughes should have been punished with a public 
admonishment or censure.10 
 
 
 
6  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.0055 (2015). 
7  NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.4653(5)(b) (2017). 
8  NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.4677 (2009). 
9  NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.4294; NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.4677(3).  
10  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.4257; NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.4677(2). 
Conclusion 
 
 The Commission failed to put into context Judge Hughes’ order when it found that Judge 
Hughes violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. The facts establish that Judge Hughes did not find 
the mother in contempt before a show-cause hearing and that Judge Hughes’ decision to lessen 
the mother’s custody rights was in the best interest of the child, not a sanction based upon a 
finding of contempt. In addition, a public reprimand was not an appropriate form of discipline 
because there was no showing that Judge Hughes deliberately or knowingly violated the Code of 
Judicial Conduct and there were no aggravating factors present to justify a public reprimand. The 
Court reversed the Commission’s decision. 
 
Concurring in part and Dissenting in part 
 
 Judge Cadish and Judge Silver agreed with the majority of the Court that the Commission 
should not have imposed a public reprimand on Judge Hughes. However, they believed that 
Judge Hughes should have received some form of punishment because Judge Hughes did violate 
some canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically, violations that are not knowing or 
deliberate and are absent aggravating factors. 
